Daniel McLaughlin
The Supreme Court’s decision in Cooper v Pinney [2024] NZSC 181 clarifies the boundaries of the same court’s landmark decision in Clayton v Clayton [2016] NZSC 29.
Clayton and Cooper both relate to the classification of rights and powers in relation to a family trust under the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 (PRA).
However, the trust considered in Clayton was unconventional in a number of respects. Mark Arnold Clayton effectively had unconstrained rights and powers in relation to the trust. As a result, those rights and powers were relationship property for the purposes of the PRA.
The respondent in Cooper, Marcus Robert William Pinney, had considerably more constrained rights and powers. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of the appellant, Pinney’s ex-partner Raewyn Phyllis Cooper, finding that his rights and powers were not relationship property for the purposes of the PRA.
Until this decision, it was not clear how far the decision in Clayton would extend.
Relationship property
Before discussing Cooper, it is necessary to discuss Clayton.
In Clayton, the Supreme Court considered whether certain rights and powers in relation to a family trust could be considered “property” under the PRA in the context of a relationship property dispute.
The court held that such rights and powers could be property for these purposes if they provided the relevant person with control over the trust assets that was “tantamount to ownership”, analogous to a general power of appointment.
The court found that Clayton did have control of this nature over the trust via his unusually unconstrained powers over the trust. He had the discretion to be the sole trustee, make himself the sole beneficiary by removing all others and to distribute the trust fund to himself, without breaching the terms of the trust or his fiduciary duties as the fiduciary duties that would ordinarily apply to trustee powers had been significantly modified.
As a result, his powers were property for the purposes of the PRA. Under the PRA, that property was relationship property and therefore divisible between him and his estranged wife, Melanie Ann Clayton.
The value of that property was calculated by reference to the value of the net assets of the trust.
The background
Cooper relates to a relationship property claim by Raewyn Cooper in respect of the MRW Pinney Trust, similar to that brought by Melanie Clayton in Clayton.
Cooper and Pinney had been in a de facto relationship between 2004 and 2014. Pinney (along with three others) settled the trust in 2005 to receive assets from a trust established by his father, including a farm.
Pinney is one of a number of trust’s beneficiaries and holds the powers to appoint and remove trustees under the deed creating the trust. He was one of the original trustees but was not a trustee by the time of the hearing.
In Clayton, the Supreme Court said “[w]e leave for another case what would be the position if the VRPT powers were less extensive: both the issue as to whether the powers were property and, if so, how they would be valued”.
Cooper has given the court an opportunity to consider a situation where trust powers are less extensive.
Cooper argued that Pinney’s rights and powers in relation to the trust gave him effective control over the trust assets. As such, they should be treated as property, and therefore relationship property, for the purposes of the PRA.
If the court agreed with Cooper, then she would have been able to access a share of the trust’s assets.
The court therefore had to consider whether Pinney’s powers of appointment and removal of trustees provided him with control “tantamount to ownership”.
The Family Court held in Cooper’s favour but the High Court overturned that decision, distinguishing the case from Clayton, and the Court of Appeal upheld the High Court’s decision.
Not relationship property
As a first step, the Supreme Court considered the proper law against which to determine the dispute.
This was relevant because the Trusts Act 2019 was enacted after the parties had separated. The court concluded that the applicable law at the time of separation in 2014, being the Trustee Act 1956, applied.
The court then examined the differences between Pinney’s powers under the trust deed and those held by Mark Clayton.
Pinney held the powers to appoint and remove, without giving reasons, trustees. However, unlike the powers in Clayton, where the trustee could act alone and make decisions in his or her own interest, the trust deed required at least two trustees and mandated that decisions be made unanimously.
These constraints meant Pinney could not use his powers to take sole control of the trust or its assets without violating his fiduciary duties, which had not been modified and were central to the operation of the trust.
Further, in the court’s view, to do so would breach the proper purpose rule (also referred to as fraud on a power).
The Supreme Court dismissed Cooper’s appeal, agreeing with the High Court and Court of Appeal that Pinney’s powers did not amount to ownership of the trust assets. The court said “we consider the combination of powers reserved to Mr Pinney under the MRWT deed to be significantly different to those powers reserved to Mr Clayton in Clayton v Clayton” (at [125]).
The court emphasised that Pinney’s fiduciary obligations, which required him to act for the benefit of all beneficiaries and not just himself, limited the extent of his control over the trust and its assets.
Further, as his power to appoint and remove trustees was fiduciary, he could not use it to appoint trustees in a way that violated the trust’s purpose or breached his obligations to other beneficiaries. In this regard the court distinguished the situation from Clayton, where the trustee could act unilaterally.
The court also considered the role of tikanga, which had been raised for the first time in the Supreme Court proceedings.
However, it declined to make a ruling on the point, noting that the matter had not been properly raised in or considered by the lower courts and could not conceivably make a difference to the outcome.
Advising clients
The Supreme Court has clearly identified the boundaries of the decision in Clayton. In this situation, Pinney’s constrained powers were not tantamount to ownership of the trust’s assets and therefore his powers were not property (nor, as a result, relationship property) under the PRA.
It is likely that Clayton will be confined to its very specific (and somewhat unusual) facts.
While rights and powers in relation to a trust can be property, it depends on the specific circumstances including, mostly importantly, the trust deed.
If the relevant spouse or partner does not have unconstrained powers, it is unlikely that his or her powers will be property. However, it is important to have these issues in mind when drafting trust deeds and particularly trust deeds on bespoke terms.
Practitioners should continue to take care not to create a trust on Clayton-like terms.
Cooper also illustrates the importance of those involved with trusts obtaining legal advice. This is necessary to protect assets in the case of those in Pinney’s position and to determine rights to property in the case of those in Cooper’s position.
This advice should be taken at an early stage in the relationship to manage expectations and avoid lengthy and expensive disputes such as this. It is likely that a suitable relationship property agreement between the parties that sets out their respective rights would have avoided this dispute.
Daniel McLaughlin is a special counsel at Dentons New Zealand

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