Constitutional law (Cth) – Zero and Low Emission Vehicle Distance-based Charge Act 2021 (Vic) – duties of excise – exclusive power of Commonwealth Parliament – scope and operation of s 90 of constitution – definition of duties of excise – tax on the consumption of goods
Vanderstock & Anor v State of Victoria [2023] HCA 30
From 1 July 2021, s 7(1) of the Zero and Low Emission Vehicle Distance-based Charge Act 2021 (Vic) required registered electric vehicle (EV) drivers to pay an annual charge to the state of Victoria for using their vehicles on effectively all public roads in Australia. The charge was based on the number of kilometres they had driven in the preceding 12 months.
Christopher Vanderstock and Kathleen Davies were registered EV drivers living in Victoria. They had been issued with invoices for, and had paid, the charge.
In September 2021, supported by the Commonwealth Attorney-General and the Australian Trucking Association, Vanderstock and Davies sued Victoria in the original jurisdiction of the High Court. The attorneys-general of the other states and territories of Australia intervened also, in support of Victoria.
Precedent and submissions
The plaintiffs challenged the constitutional validity of s 7(1) of the Act, arguing it was invalid because it imposed a “duty of excise” within the meaning of s 90 of the Constitution.
Under s 90, only the Commonwealth Parliament has the authority to impose duties of customs and excise. This meaning had been accepted, by a majority in Dickenson’s Arcade Pty Ltd v Tasmania (1974) 130 CLR 177, as referring to an inland tax “on production, manufacture, sale or distribution of goods”. Dickenson’s Arcade held a tax on goods imposed at the stage of consumption did not constitute an excise duty.
In Vanderstock and Davies’ case, the ZLEV charge seemingly was a tax on consumption. The plaintiffs argued the court should reopen and overrule Dickenson’s Arcade, to read s 90 as including the ZLEV charge.
Victoria argued the ZLEV charge was not an excise – it was a tax on an activity, not on a good. Alternatively, a tax on consumption was not an excise and Dickenson’s Arcade should be affirmed, or that an excise under s 90 should be read as a “tax that falls selectively upon locally produced goods” in accordance with the minority judgments in Capital Duplicators Pty Ltd v Australian Capital Territory [No 2] (1993) 178 CLR 561 and Ha v New South Wales (1997) 189 CLR 465.
The state and territory attorneys-general submitted that overruling Dickenson’s Arcade could leave some categories of taxation open to challenge.
Two issues were before the court: whether an inland tax imposed on the consumption of goods could constitute a duty of excise within s 90 and, if so, whether the ZLEV charge was a duty of excise.
Majority decision
Kiefel CJ and Gageler and Gleeson JJ, with Jagot J in agreement, found in the plaintiffs’ favour: s 7(1) of the Act was invalid.
The purpose of s 90 is to give the Commonwealth Parliament exclusive control of the taxation of goods to ensure state or territory taxation of goods does not hamper or defeat uniformity in federal trade, commerce or taxation policy.
In reopening and overruling Dickenson’s Arcade, the court held an excise within the meaning of s 90 included an inland tax on goods imposed at any stage of their life cycle. Taxing consumption could depress demand for goods in the same way taxes on production, manufacture, sale or distribution could because it would increase the cost of goods to consumers; they would factor it into the price they were prepared to pay. Because of this tendency to depress demand, a state tax on the consumption of goods could hit the flow of trade in goods into and out of the states or territories. To limit taxes on goods to just production and distribution was irreconcilable with s 90, the majority said.
To determine whether a tax is a tax on goods, and therefore a duty of excise, the majority held the tax must satisfy two elements. It must:
- bear a close relation to the production or manufacture, sale, distribution or consumption of goods; and
- affect the goods as the subjects of manufacture or production or as articles of commerce.
The ZLEV charge met the criteria. It had a close relation to the use of EVs and it affected such vehicles as articles of commerce because it tended to affect demand for EVs.
Dissents
While the minority took largely differing approaches in their dissents, their collective criticism took aim at the majority’s inappropriate broadening of the meaning of excise. Consequently, the court’s decision would have significant implications for any future state taxes on goods more generally.
Unlike Gordon and Edelman JJ, Justice Steward held the ZLEV charge was not a tax on goods at all. In accepting Victoria’s submission, the judge said the charge was a tax on the use of EVs in defined circumstances, rather than a tax on the vehicle itself. If it were a tax on consumption, however, Steward J said Dickenson’s Arcade should not be reopened as it still had value as a precedent: once out of the stream of production and distribution, taxes on goods were not duties of excise.
Justice Gordon, in relying on authority that said duties of excise must affect goods as the subjects of “articles of commerce”, said excise was essentially a “trading tax” as it concerned the commercial dealing in commodities (a point Steward J also made). Such taxes naturally tended to enter into the purchase price of goods, in contrast to taxes on consumption, which didn’t have that effect.
The judge criticised the majority’s view that the assessment required determining whether a tax tended to depress demand. The effect that a tax would have on demand or the market for goods would depend on several complex factors, including its size, consumer preferences, the regulatory environment, its relationship with any complementary goods and the purchase price of other substitutes.
Gordon J also warned the new rule would “radically” affect the ability of the states and territories to raise taxation revenue. Years of litigation would follow as the courts sought to determine how the new rule would work.
Edelman J discerned from the authorities three constraints on the meaning or application of an excise: a tax must anticipate a “real and substantial” economic effect in a market for the sale of goods; that economic effect must be on the supply-side of that market; and the supply-side economic effect must directly arise in that market for the sale of goods.
The judge viewed the majority’s decision as amounting to a removal of the second and third constraints. The majority’s conception of demand also rested on false economic assumptions. Edelman J also alluded to certain other taxes (on gifts or inheritances, payroll, land and other consumption-based goods) as being on uncertain constitutional ground because of the new rule.
Applicable principles: Constitutional law (Cth) – duties of excise – exclusive power of Commonwealth Parliament – scope and operation of s 90 of Constitution – whether s 7(1) of the ZLEV Charge Act 2021 (Vic) purported to oblige registered operator of ZLEV to pay a charge for use of vehicle on specified roads – whether specified roads included all roads in Victoria and all public roads elsewhere in Commonwealth – whether ZLEV charge properly characterised as tax on goods – whether definition of duty of excise stated in Capital Duplicators [No 2] and Ha as tax on production, manufacture, sale or distribution of goods exhaustive or descriptive – where application for leave to reopen Capital Duplicators [No 2] and Ha refused – whether inland tax on goods imposed at stage of consumption answers description of duty of excise – whether Dickenson’s Arcade should be reopened and overruled.
Held: by majority, s 7(1) of the ZLEV Charge Act is invalid on the basis it imposes a duty of excise within the meaning of s 90 of the Constitution.
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