Appeal against High Court finding that Crown liable for breach of rights where disproportionately severe sentence was imposed on a ‘third strike’ offender – New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (Bill of Rights), ss 9, 22; Sentencing Act 2002, s 86D – respective roles of the prosecutor and the court – challenge to decision to prosecute for particular offence charged – application of Solicitor-General’s Prosecution Guidelines – can the prosecutor be liable for a breach of the Bill of Rights as a result of the sentencing process miscarrying?
Attorney-General of New Zealand v Fitzgerald [2024] NZCA 419
On 3 December 2016, Daniel Fitzgerald, who suffers from schizophrenia, grabbed a woman and attempted to kiss her on the mouth while walking down Cuba Street in downtown Wellington.
She moved her face away, so his kiss landed on her cheek instead.
Fitzgerald was charged by the police with indecent assault (and assault on the woman’s friend when she intervened).
The indecent assault charge was his third qualifying offence under the ‘three strikes regime’. In accordance with a Memorandum of Understanding, the police referred the matter to the Crown Solicitor for peer review.
Following this peer review, the police confirmed their decision to proceed with the indecent assault charge. Fitzgerald’s counsel unsuccessfully attempted to get the charge amended to doing an indecent act (not a three- strikes qualifying offence).
After the prosecution formally became a Crown prosecution, the prosecutor filed a Crown charge notice, confirming the decision she had made to proceed on the indecent assault charge.
The prosecutor could not recall considering likely sentencing consequences in her assessment of the public interest test for prosecution under the Solicitor-General’s Prosecution Guidelines.
There was also no suggestion she gave consideration to Fitzgerald’s mental health.
Fitzgerald was found guilty at trial and sentenced to the maximum penalty, seven years’ imprisonment.
At the time, it was considered that this sentence was required by s 86D(2) Sentencing Act 2002. This was the position taken by the prosecutor, Fitzgerald’s counsel, the High Court, Crown counsel on appeal and the Court of Appeal which dismissed his appeal against sentence.
The Supreme Court allowed Fitzgerald’s second appeal, holding that the sentence imposed breached his right not to be subject to disproportionately severe treatment (s 9 Bill of Rights), and that if the application of s 86D(2) would breach this right, courts should sentence in accordance with ordinary principles.
Fitzgerald was subsequently resentenced by the High Court to a term of six months’ imprisonment and immediately released, as by that stage, he had already served around five years’ imprisonment.
Fitzgerald then brought a damages claim against the Crown in the High Court based on the breach of his s 9 right.
The High Court held that he had been arbitrarily detained, in breach of his right under s 22 Bill of Rights, for approximately 44 months. His continued detention became arbitrary at the point where it was grossly disproportionate to his offending.
Fitzgerald’s claim was focused on the actions of the Crown prosecutor.
He could not bring a claim against the Attorney-General in relation to the sentence imposed by the judge because of the Supreme Court judgment in Attorney-General v Chapman [2011] NZSC 110, [2012] 1 NZLR 462, which confined liability for breaches of the Bill of Rights to actions of the executive branch.
The High Court determined that the breach of Fitzgerald’s rights was the consequence of the Crown prosecutor’s charging decision – the prosecutor had a duty to prefer a different charge where proceeding with the indecent assault charge would result in the foreseeable and likely grossly disproportionate sentence.
Fitzgerald was awarded $450,000 in damages, together with interest.
The Attorney-General appealed.
Applicable principles: New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, ss 9, 22; Sentencing Act 2002, s 86D – respective roles of the prosecutor and the court – challenge to decision to prosecute for particular offence charged – application of Solicitor-General’s Prosecution Guidelines – can the prosecutor be liable for a breach of the Bill of Rights as a result of the sentencing process miscarrying?
Held: The appeal is allowed. The judgment of the High Court is set aside.
The sentence ultimately imposed and the corresponding breach of Fitzgerald’s rights was the act of the sentencing judge, not the prosecutor.
The prosecutor cannot be liable for a breach of the Bill of Rights as a result of the sentencing process miscarrying.
Note: The court noted that consideration should be given to extending the compensation scheme for wrongful imprisonment to apply to persons whose sentence is shown to breach s 9 Bill of Rights where the appeals process has not removed the grossly disproportionate element of the sentence.
The court stating that “[t]here is every reason to suppose that such cases would be few and far between, especially now that the implications of s 9 on the sentencing process are properly understood”.
0 Comments