Warren Pyke
On 27 May 2025 the New Zealand Bar Association issued a press release headed, “Bar Association warns of risk to rule of law”. The press release advised:
“The Government has said that it intends to introduce legislation to prevent the courts from deciding claims for climate change damages. If enacted this legislation will prevent a case that is before the courts from being heard and decided.
“Over the past year the Bar Association has raised with the Government the way in which the legislative power of Parliament has been used with retrospective effect on existing rights and claims. The trend is disturbing, particularly where legislation may be rushed through with limited time to consider and debate its content, and whether there are truly circumstances justifying making laws with such an effect.
“If retrospective legislation becomes a regular occurrence or norm, citizens will not know with any certainty what their rights are. The certainty and stability provided by the established way in which law is made for all is put at risk, and the important role of the independent court system is undermined. The aim of the intended legislation is to stop the courts deciding certain claims and provide certainty in the affairs of some citizens. But the overuse of retrospective legislation to remove existing rights or claims creates a bigger more general uncertainty and unpredictability for citizens. We consider that it is time for Parliament to allow the courts to do their work as independent decision-makers on the law and respect this role; and for legislative power to be exercised on established principles, with retrospective legislation reserved for exceptional circumstances that may justify it after appropriate consideration and debate.”
The reference to proposed climate change legislation referred to the announcement of Justice Minister Paul Goldsmith on May 12, 2026, that legislation was planned to prevent findings of liability in tort for climate change damage caused by greenhouse gas emissions. This proposed reform is aimed specifically at the claim which was allowed to run in Smith v Fonterra Co-operative Group & Ors [2024] NZSC 5; [2024] 1 NZLR 134 It seems that the Association’s broadly worded press release also has in mind the Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) (Customary Marine Title) Amendment Act 2025, which knocked on the head an aspect of the claim in Whakatōhea Kotahitanga Waka-Edwards v Ngāti Ira O Waioweka [2025] NZSC 104; [2025] 1 NZLR 739 (‘Edwards’), among other cases (see Part 2, s 16, adding a provision to this effect, being s 59B of the Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act 2011).
It is open to Parliament to make a statute retrospective in effect, on “established principles”. What are these principles?
What is meant by ‘retrospective’ can be debated, such as the difference between retrospective and retroactive legislation, one commentator postulating that retrospective legislation can attach legal consequences to an event or transaction that took place in the past, whereas retroactive legislation operates on past events as though it were in force when the past event took place (see Jeremy Waldron “Retroactive Law: How Dodgy was Duynhoven?” (2004) 10 Otago LR 631). Some doubt the force of this distinction (see P Sampford, Retrospectivity and the Rule of Law 1st Edition, Oxford University Press, 2006).
Legal rights may be altered by statutory language that is facially prospective, but which in operation has retrospective effects. Sometimes retrospective enactments validate past acts or fix a date to achieve certainty (such as when passing a Budget). Statutory provisions dealing with procedural matters (as opposed to substantive rights and obligations) would be regarded as operating “retrospectively” unless a contrary intention is expressed or implied in the repealing statute (see Crown Health Financing Agency v P [2008] NZCA 362; [2009] 2 NZLR 149, at [189], per Hammond J).
In Walker v Innospec Limited and Others [2017] UKSC 47, the UK Supreme Court opined that the “general rule, applicable in most modern legal systems, is that legislative changes apply prospectively” and “[u]nder English law, for example, unless a contrary intention appears, an enactment is presumed not to be intended to have retrospective effect” (at para. 22(2)). The Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights has held that “while in principle the legislature is not precluded in civil matters from adopting new retrospective provisions to regulate rights arising under existing laws, the principle of the rule of law and the notion of fair trial enshrined in Article 6 preclude any interference by the legislature – other than on compelling grounds of the general interest – with the administration of justice designed to influence the judicial determination of a dispute” (see Zielinski and Ors. v France, 28 October 1999, at para. 57(3)).
Section 12 of the Legislation Act 2019 carries over earlier law that “Legislation does not have retrospective effect,” however, it is subject to the proviso in s 9 which says that a provision in the Act applies to legislation unless the legislation provides otherwise, or the context of legislation requires a different interpretation. Accordingly, what s 12 creates is a presumption against retrospectivity. The ultimate question is one of construction of the statute, which requires the weighing of retrospectivity concerns against the intention of Parliament, as stated in the scheme and language of an Act; if it is clear that Parliament intended a retrospective effect, it must be applied in those terms (see Dean v Accident Compensation Corporation [1982] 1 NLZR 750 (CA), and see in relation to pending claims in proceedings Attorney-General v Vernazza [1960] AC 965 (HL)). This is so even when proceedings are pending before the legislation came into force, including when an appeal is pending (see Sharplin v Broadlands Finance Ltd [1982] 2 NZLR 1 (CA)).
There is a difference between depriving someone of the fruits of a claim and depriving them of the opportunity to establish a claim and obtain relief, but both can occur upon the passing of retrospective legislation (see for example Fisheries Act 1996 Amendment Act 2008, which was passed to alter the effect of the quota ruling in Antons Trawling Company Limited and another v The Minister of Fisheries and Chief Executive of the Ministry of Fisheries [2008] NZHC 2168).
Looking at the two instances referred to against these principles, in Smith v Fonterra, the Supreme Court allowed Mr. Smith to advance a novel claim that sought to invigilate settings in the existing climate change legislation; this ruling fired the first shot in this particular battle. In reversing the Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court’s ruling itself created legal uncertainty by potentially exposing an indeterminate number of otherwise law-abiding emitters to collateral tortious claims. While upholding access to justice was one reason to have allowed Smith’s claim to run, the uncertainty created by his novel claim can be convincingly argued as a countervailing justification for legislating to put a stop it (this is quite aside from whether the claim had any likelihood of success, which in my view it did not).
In relation to the Marine and Coastal Area Act reform, the view of government politicians was that the courts were not applying the legislation as Parliament intended; this gave rise to the Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) (Customary Marine Title) Amendment Bill, reported back from the Justice Select Committee on December 3, 2024, and which was due to have its second reading, consideration by the Committee of the Whole House and third reading soon thereafter. The purpose of the Bill, as recorded in its preamble, was to conform the law to Parliament’s intent when passing the Act in 2011, thereby correcting the interpretation given to the salient statutory test by the Court of Appeal in Whakatōhea Kotahitanga Waka (Edwards) v Te Kāhui and Whakatōhea Māori Trust Board [2023] NZCA 504, [2023] 3 NZLR 252.
The Supreme Court delivered its judgment on 2 December 2024, 17 days after the hearing (an 8 day hearing, with submissions from 19 parties). This gave the appearance to some of an unusual rush to judgment, some questioning whether the court even had the power to issue a preliminary determination (see this critique at https://lawnews.nz/administrative-public/the-edwards-judgment-a-nullity-designed-to-pre-empt-parliament/); there is no power in the Senior Courts Act or the Supreme Court Rules for preliminary determinations (cf the High Court Rules, where it is explicit), although the court may have the inherent power to issue an interim judgment (this issue is not canvassed in the judgment, and no party has sought to revisit the ruling on these grounds).
Former Attorney General Christopher Finlayson KC, whose opinion commands respect, thought the Supreme Court’s expedited interim judgment supplied the necessary clarity to allow the claims to run to final judgment without the need for clarifying legislation. In an impassioned critique, Finalyson said: “These amendments do not restore the original intention of Parliament. They undermine them. Let there be no doubt about that at all.” (https://newsroom.co.nz/2025/08/06/former-attorney-general-criticises-marine-and-coastal-areas-act-changes/)
These two instances may be compared to the US case of Robertson, Chief, United States Forest Service, et al. v. Seattle Audubon Society, et al 503 U.S. 429 (1992). This litigation concerned harvesting in old-growth forests that are home to the northern spotted owl, an endangered species (over thirty years later, it clings on: while the northern spotted owl population has been declining owing to deforestation, this is also partly due to habitat overlap with the barred owl). During the course of the litigation, Congress legislated changes to the law, although not reversing final judgments in cases under the old law; the amending legislation changed legal standards underlying two cases. The Federal District Court upheld the provision but the Ninth Circuit reversed (914 F.2d 1311 (1990)), holding that the amending legislation did not, by “its plain language, repeal or amend the environmental laws underlying this litigation,” but rather it directed the court to reach a specific result and make certain factual findings under existing law in connection with the two pending cases. The Supreme Court overturned the Ninth Circuit (a not uncommon occurrence, but that is another story), holding that the amending legislation compelled changes in the law, not findings or results under old law, finding that nothing in the amending legalisation purported to direct any particular findings of fact or applications of law, old or new, to the facts. Explicit reference to pending cases in the amending legislation, to the extent that it affected the adjudication of those cases, did so by effectively modifying the provisions at issue in those cases, not directing a result. No constitutional issues therefore arose, whether as to retroactive application or separation of powers. While the threatened disappearance of an avian species does not compare to the herculean task of saving the planet, nor does it involve cultural sensitivities like the MACA litigation, the reasoning of the US Supreme Court is instructive.
In June 2025 the New Zealand Law Society in its report on the rule of law (see https://www.lawsociety.org.nz/assets/Law-Reform/Rule-of-law/Strengthening-the-rule-of-law-in-Aotearoa-New-Zealand.pdf), commented that legal certainty is a fundamental requirement of the rule of law. The report observed that retrospective legislation may undermine the rule of law by making it impossible for affected individuals to foresee and plan how they can comply with the law, and to adjust their behaviour and actions accordingly. Citing the Legislation Design and Advisory Committee Legislation Guidelines (2021 ed, September 2021), the report argues that strong reasons are usually required to justify a departure from the presumption against retrospective legislation in order to avoid undermining the rule of law. The difference between the NZLS approach and the NZBA;s press release, is that the NZLS explores the topic in more depth, although at a high level as regards retrospective law-making and fast-track legislative processes (see Part 7 of the report, commencing page 56); more to the point, it does not take tendentious aim at specific instances.
Merely announcing via press release that retrospective legislation is being overused says very little about what the problem actually is at present. In fact, it omits looking at complicated questions of comity, as I have attempted to tease out above. If it is said that there is a systemic problem of bad law making, then that should be addressed by adequate reasoning, not by proclamation; if, however, the real target of the criticism is specific instances, then those ought to be focussed upon and argued in depth. Specific instances might or might not indicate a troubling trend, but this cannot be evaluated on the strength of a polemicised press release.
As I reference above, a central rule of law implication for retrospective laws is that they create uncertainty – people are entitled to organise their affairs based upon a clear articulation of the law (whether that be statutory or judge-made). In addition, the right to access justice ought not to be interfered with by the legislature except for principled reasons, and only to the extent necessary. Some would argue that retrospective legislation always raises rule of law issues, some would not, depending on which version of the rule of law, ‘thin’ or ‘thick’, or variations on those themes, is preferred (for instance, a strict Diceyan view might be that it is well within the ‘sovereignty’ of Parliament to pass retrospective legislation that creates greater certainty or to address a pressing societal need, notwithstanding its effect on existing claims or rights). None of this nuance is even alluded to in the press release, which instead flies the flag of the ‘rule of law’ as a banner of righteousness.
Radio New Zealand when reporting on the press release described the NZBA as a “politically neutral group” that represents members of the independent bar; it also reported that Labour leader Chris Hipkins agreed with the Bar Association, saying: “this government is showing an absolute contempt for good democracy and good law making.” (https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/political/596396/nz-bar-association-calls-for-government-to-reconsider-changing-climate-law-to-prevent-lawsuits). Given the wording and timing of the press release, it is unsurprising that the leader of the opposition interpreted the press release as critical of the current government, rather than of parliamentary lawmaking over a longer period of time.

Warren Pyke
My primary criticisms of the press release are of its superficial method and its political effect. Far from using measured language in an attempt to encourage law-makers to stop and think, the press release reprimands them in a stentorian tone – “We consider that it is time for Parliament to allow the courts to do their work as independent decision-makers on the law and respect this role… .” There is a whiff of the pompous in the Association’s use of language. Read as a whole, the press release is a barely concealed castigation of the current government, clothed in the language of legal principle. The press release is strong in attack, but weak in rigorous analysis; it only wades in the shallows of the issues that it highlights; it has predictably been acclaimed by the leader of the opposition as a timely rebuke of the current government in an election year: that interpretation was inevitable and unfortunate, particularly for the Association, and its aspiration to be politically neutral.

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